ABSTRACT A growing number of organizations and individuals outsource their data to the cloud. As the cloud service provider is potentially untrustworthy, cloud user needs to encrypt their sensitive data before outsourcing. One challenge of the cloud service is how to provide an effective search on encrypted data while preserving user privacy. The existing attribute-based keyword search (ABKS) scheme has addressed this issue and enabled a data owner to conduct the search over the outsourced data utilizing an access policy. However, the encryption cost in ABKS linearly increases with the number of attributes in the access policy. In this paper, we proposed a dynamic hierarchical ABKS (DHABKS) scheme to efficiently achieve fine-grained search authorization. We introduced the attribute hierarchy into access policy to improve the encryption performance of the scheme and devised a dynamic updating access policy to largely reduce the workload of the data owner. The efficiency and effectiveness of the DHABKS scheme are validated by extensive experiments using real data sets.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing as an emerging computing paradigm offers a variety of resources via Internet in a pay-as-you-go way, and provides users with great benefits, such as elasticity, flexibility and scalability [1] , [2] . Especially, for some small and medium-sized enterprises, they can reduce the burden of local data storage and improve the quality of service by outsourcing their services and data to cloud servers. However, the cloud service provider (CSP), such as IBM Cloud, Amazon AWS, and Google Cloud, is outside the users' trusted domain and may leak users' sensitive data intentionally or unintentionally. Therefore, it is a recommended practice for users to encrypt sensitive information before they outsource their data so as to protect user privacy.
However, encryption of data would make traditional keyword-based searching on ciphertexts be a very challenging work. To address this issue, a simple method is to download the whole encrypted data from cloud servers and locally decrypt them, which would incur extensive communication and computational cost. To allow a user to retrieve data from cloud while preserving the privacy, some searchable encryption (SE) [3] - [7] methods were proposed. The data owner would encrypt each file or data using traditional cryptography and encrypts the related keywords of the file using SE under index key pk separately. When the data user wants to retrieve file described by a keyword w, he should first ask the data owner for search key sk to generate a search token, and sends a search request to CSP. The CSP evaluates the search token over keyword ciphertexts and finds the ciphertexts of files whose keywords match the search token, then returns them to the user, who locally decrypts ciphertexts to retrieve the file contents.
However, the previous SE methods only provides coarsegrained search authorization. As the data user is able to generate search tokens for all keywords using sk, which would increase the risk of privacy disclosure of user. Let us consider such a scenario: Company A outsources its encrypted project management system to the CSP, such as IBM Cloud. Assume a collaboration agreement F related to keywords ''Project X'' and ''Company B'' can be retrieved only by the project manager of Company A. Once adversary Alice can be allowed to search files with the keyword of ''Project X'' and files with the keyword of ''Company B'', he can easily infer that Company A is working with Company B on Project X from the returned results, even without recovering file content.
To solve this problem, the attribute-based keyword search (ABKS) scheme [8] was proposed, which used the technology of attribute-based encryption (ABE) [9] , [10] to grant search authorization in a fine-grained way. In ABKS, each keyword w i is associated with an access policy AP, and each search token is associated with a keyword w j and a set of attributes S. The data user is allowed to access the file only when his attributes satisfy the access policy, that is S AP, and w i = w j . In the previous example, assume the access policy for keywords ''Project A'' and ''Company B'' is AP = {Project Manager}, then only the program managers of Company A have the search permission.
However, the encryption cost in ABKS linearly grows with the number of attributes in the access policy. Since the number of attributes in the system would be large, the cost of encryption may be expensive. Moreover, ABKS hardly considered the issue of dynamic updating for access policy. When AP needs to be changed to AP , it requires the data owner to re-encrypt the related keywords with AP , such that only the data users whose attributes satisfy AP are qualified to search the file. The overhead on the data owner will be heavy due to the frequent updating on a large number of files.
In this paper, we propose a dynamic hierarchical attributebased keyword search (DHABKS) scheme to efficiently achieve fine-grained search authorization in a privacypreserving way. First, we build a hierarchical structure for attributes in the system. In the attribute hierarchy tree that we construct, the ancestor node is a generalization of the descendant nodes. Our scheme encrypts keywords with a small amount of specific attributes at a lower level, so that the users with generalized attributes at a higher level can decrypt them. For instance, the original access policy is shown in Fig. 1-(a) . If we build an attribute hierarchy tree as shown in Fig. 1-(c) , the original access policy can be simplified as shown in Fig. 1-(b) . Therefore, the number of attributes in access policy is saved by 42%. In our scheme, we encode each node in an attribute hierarchy tree by utilizing the positive-negative depth-first (PNDF) coding to realize the attribute hierarchy. Then, we use the forward derivation function to allow the FIGURE 1. Application scenario.
ancestor attribute node to deduce the secret shares associated with its descendant attribute nodes. Therefore, the cloud users who are associated with the generalized attributes can retrieve files containing the target keyword which is encrypted by the users with some specific attributes.
Next, we propose a policy updating scheme, by incorporating secret sharing scheme (SSS) and proxy re-encryption (PRE) [11] into our scheme. DHABKS uses an access tree to present the access policy AP as so that the processing of updating on an AND/OR gate in AP is transformed to update a threshold gate. For example, the OR gate is denoted as threshold gate (1, t) , and the AND gate is denoted as threshold gate (t, t). Therefore, the updating operation of the OR gate can be regarded as changing gate (1, t) to (1, t ), and the updating operation of the AND gate can be regarded as changing gate (t, t) to (t , t ), where t = t + 1 means to add an attribute to a AND/OR gate and t = t − 1 means to remove an attribute from the AND/OR gate. In this way, the CSP can dynamically update the access policy on demand while preserving user privacy.
Our main contributions are as follows:
1) We proposed DHABKS scheme to efficiently achieve fine-grained search permission in cloud, by introducing the attribute hierarchy to reduce the encryption cost and improve the performance of the scheme. 2) We devise a dynamic access policy to largely reduces the overhead of the data owner by entrusting the policy updating to the CSP. 3) We conduct extensive experiments using real data sets to verify the efficiency and effectiveness of the DHABKS scheme.
Paper Organization: We introduce our models and goals in Section II, and cryptographic preliminaries in Section III. Then, we give an overview of our DHABKS scheme in Section IV and provide the construction of DHABKS in Section V. We evaluate our scheme in Section VI, and introduce related work in Section VII. Finally, we conclude our paper in Section VIII.
II. MODELS AND GOALS
This section first introduces our system model and attack model, then we describe the design goals of this paper.
A. SYSTEM MODEL
The system is composed of the following roles: the cloud service provider (CSP), the cloud users, and the trusted third party (TTP), as shown in Fig. 2 . The cloud users, who outsource their data or applications to cloud servers, will pay the services provided by the CSP. They can be further categorized into dataowner and datauser. The former outsources the encrypted data and relevant keywords to the cloud server and authorizes the latter to access them. The data user retrieves data of interest by searching matched files based on keywords. The CSP, deploying the cloud platforms, provides the data storage and search services, and also conducts the VOLUME 6, 2018 FIGURE 2. System model.
operations of policy updating on behalf of the data owner as well. The TTP takes charge of issuing credentials to all users.
B. ATTACK MODEL
The TTP and cloud users are assumed to be fully trusted. Therefore, there are two kinds of attacks at such a circumstance: internal attacks initiated by an honest but curious CSP and external attacks initiated by unauthorized outsiders. ''honest but curious'' here means that the CSP will always honestly execute all required commands in the system, but may be curious about the stored data or the received information. The communication channels are regarded be secure since the existing security schemes and protocols i.e., SSL (Secure Sockets Layer) and SSH (Secure Shell) can provide the security for the data transmitted in the communication networks, thus we only consider the internal attacks in our attack model.
Since the privacy preservation for user data can be achieved by methods proposed by our previous work in [12] - [14] , the DHABKS scheme mainly aims to protect both query privacy and keyword privacy for the cloud users. While, in the publickey system, we should consider this scenario: the adversary would handpick a keyword and encrypt it, then he checks whether the target search token and the resulting ciphertext correspond to the same keyword. Therefore, the search token is vulnerable to the keyword-guessing attack. Following the work in [8] and [15] , assume a probabilistic polynomialtime adversary A model the CSP, the DHABKS scheme is considered to be secure if the following cases hold:
• Selective security against chosen-keyword attacks.
Given the ciphertext of a keyword that mismatches all the search tokens, adversary A unable to infer any knowledge about the plaintext of keyword in the selective security model [16] .
• Keyword secrecy. The probability that adversary A learns the keyword from the keyword ciphertext and search tokens is negligibly more than the probability of a correct random-keyword guess.
C. DESIGN GOAL
Our goal is to achieve dynamic access policy for attributebased keyword search in an efficient way.
• Fine-grained search authorization. The data owner is able to control the keyword search operation over the outsourced encrypted data.
• Hierarchical attribute. The hierarchical structure for attributes is built to improve the encryption performance of the scheme.
• Dynamic search permission. The access policy for keyword-based searches can be updated on demand.
• Efficiency. The CSP can be entrusted to conduct the policy updating in a privacy-preserving way. The encryption cost can be largely reduced by introducing attribute hierarchy into ABKS which makes the keyword search more efficient.
III. CRYPTOGRAPHIC PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we will describe the basic cryptographic preliminaries used in our scheme.
A. BILINEAR MAP
Assume G 0 and G 1 be two cyclic groups of large prime order n, a bilinear map [17] , e : G 0 × G 0 → G 1 , has the following properties: 1) Computable: It requires a polynomial time to compute e(g 1 , g 2 ) for any
B. PROXY RE-ENCRYPTION
Proxy Re-Encryption (PRE) [11] allows a semi-trusted proxy server to convert a ciphertext that is encrypted by secret key sk 1 into another ciphertext that can be decrypted by secret key sk 2 , without learning the plaintext and secret keys sk 1 , sk 2 . In our DHABKS scheme, the data owner can issue an update instruction to the CSP, who can be entrusted to re-encrypt the keyword ciphertexts and update the access policy while preserving user privacy.
C. FORWARD/BACKWARD DERIVATION FUNCTION
In comparable-based encryption (CBE) [18] , [19] , integer comparisons are achieved by the forward/backward derivation functions. Given a set of positive integers U = {t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t T }, with total ordering 0 ≤ t 1 ≤ t 2 ≤ . . . , ≤ t T ≤ Z , where Z is the maximal integer. Assume ϕ, ϕ be two random generators in G n , where n = p q , p and q are two large primes. The functions (ψ(·), ψ(·)) which map from integer set U = {t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t T } to V = {v t 1 , . . . , v t T } ∈ G n and V = {v t 1 , . . . , v t T } ∈ G n are defined as follows:
where λ, µ are randomly chosen from Z * n . According to the definition of ψ(·), ψ(·) (see Eq. 1), the forward derivation function (FDF), f (·), and the backward derivation function (BDF), f (·), are defined as follows:
Under the RSA assumption, FDF and BDF have the one − way property, λ −1 and ϕ −1 cannot be efficiently computed based on the secrecy of n . This means that Eq. 2 can be computable in a polynomial-time; However, it is infeasible to compute v t j from v t i while t i > t j , and compute v t j from v t i while t i < t j .
IV. OVERVIEW A. ACCESS TREE
The access policy AP, as described in [10] , is defined as an access tree T , in which each leave node is depicted as an attribute and each interior node denotes a gate. For example, given AP K = (A 1 ∨ A 2 ) ∧ A 3 , its access tree T is illustrated in Fig. 3 -(a). In T , each node x is associated with a threshold value k x . For a interior node x with N x children, k x = 1, when x is an OR gate, and k x = N x , when x is an AND gate. For each leave node, the threshold value is 1. If lev(T ) is the set of leave nodes in T , for any x ∈ lev(T ), function att(x) denotes the attribute associated with node x. Thus, T denotes an ordering of the children of each node, and parent(x) returns the parent, index(x) returns the order number of the children node x. Assume T with root node R be the access tree correspond to access policy AP. In order to check whether a set of attributes of user u S u satisfies AP, denoted as S u AP, the process is to compute T R (S u ) recursively as follows: Let T x denote the subtree of T rooted at the node of x. Suppose x is a non-leaf node, we compute T b (S u ) for all children b of node x. T x (S u ) returns 1 when and only when at least k x children return 1. Suppose x is a leaf node, T x (S u ) returns 1 when and only when att(x) ∈ S u . To share the secret σ in access tree T , the SSS generates = {q x (0)} x∈T as follows:
SSS(σ, T ) → : A random polynomial q R of degree k R −1 is chosen for q R (0) = σ . The rest of the points of q R are randomly chosen. For each node x ∈ T , a random polynomial q x of degree k x − 1 is chosen for q x (0) = q parent(x) (index(x)). The rest of points of q x are chosen randomly. For example, Fig. 3 -(b) shows the implementation process of a sample tree. The users with sufficient secret shares can recover the secret σ by performing Lagrange interpolation recursively.
B. POSITIVE-NEGATIVE DEPTH-FIRST CODING
Let A = {A 1 , . . . , A M } denote the universal attributes in the system, from which we build an attribute hierarchy A of K levels. In the tree structure, each node is associated with two hierarchical codes, that is, the positive depth-first code (Pcode) and the negative depth-first code (Ncode), and the attribute at a higher level is a generalization of attributes at a lower level. We needs two stacks, PcodeStack and NcodeStack to code each node. For the PcodeStack, we first push the root node R to PcodeStack; then, traversal the node's left subtree; finally, traversal the node's right subtree. When traversal left subtree and right subtree, we repeat the above three steps recursively until the subtrees are empty, thus the right subtree's Pcodes will be larger than those of left subtree. For the NcodeStack, we first push the root node R to NcodeStack; then, traversal the node's right subtree; finally, traversal the node's left subtree. When traversal right subtree and left subtree, we repeat the above three steps recursively until the subtrees are empty, thus the left subtree's Pcodes will be larger than those of right subtree.
For example, an attribute hierarchy tree is shown in 
C. FORWARD DERIVATION FUNCTION
In our scheme, let m be the number of nodes in the attribute hierarchy, the hierarchical codes are defined as a set of discrete values U m = {(Pcode 1 , Ncode 1 ), (Pcode 2 , Ncode 2 ), . . . , (Pcode m , Ncode m )}. We apply the forward derivation function (FDF) to accomplish the attribute hierarchy.
Let G 0 be a multiplicative group of prime order n. First, we choose random generator ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 ∈ G 0 and random numbers θ 1 , θ 2 ∈ Z n . Next, we define
According to the definitions of φ 1 (.), φ 2 (.), the forward derivation function (FDF), f 1 (.) and f 2 (.), are defined as follows:
Under the RSA assumption, FDF has the ''one-way'' property. This means that Eq. 4 
D. SCHEME DEFINITION
The summary notations are shown in Table 1 . The definition of our scheme consists of the following algorithms:
The TTP takes a security parameter λ and the attribute hierarchy A as input to initialize the system, and outputs system public key PK A and system master key MK .
• KeyGen(PK A , MK , S u ) → sk u : The TTP takes system public key PK A , system master key MK , and a set of attributes S u associated with data user u as input, and outputs search key sk u for u.
• EncKW (PK A , w, T w ) → (cph w , ): Given keyword w associated with access tree T w , the data owner takes system public key PK A , T w and w as inputs, and outputs the keyword ciphertext cph w and the secret shares for nodes in T w .
• TokenGen(sk u , w) → Tok w : The data user u takes a keyword w and the search key sk u as inputs, and outputs a search token Tok w for w. • Search(Tok w , cph w ) → {0, 1}: Upon receiving the search request from the data user u, the CSP evaluates the search token Tok w on keyword ciphertext cph w , and outputs 1 if S u T w . Otherwise, it outputs 0.
• GenUpd( , T w ) → (UK , ): The data owner takes the new access tree T w and the secret shares for nodes in the original access tree T w as inputs, and outputs an update key UK and some auxiliary information .
• ExeUpd(UK , , cph w ) → cph w : The CSP utilizes the update key UK and the auxiliary information to update the original ciphertext cph w to the new ciphertext cph w .
In the attribute hierarchy A, let A = {A 1 , . . . , A M } denote the universal attributes, each attribute A i , A i ∈ A, contains two hierarchy codes, {Pcode i , Ncode i }, and the descendant node's codes are lager than those of its ancestors. The data user u is described by a set of attributes S u ⊆ A, where each attribute 
E. POLICY UPDATING
The DHABKS scheme delegates policy updating to the CSP, so that it can achieve an efficient update of access policy. When file F i 's access policy AP is modified to AP , the data owner should build a corresponding access tree T w for AP . With the T w and the secret shares , it will generate auxiliary information and the update key UK . Then the data owner submit the update instruction the CSP, which is = {Fid, UO, UK , }, where Fid is the ID of file, UO is the specific update operation. Based on , the CSP locates file F i and generates new ciphertexts {cph w } w∈W i to cover the original ciphertexts.
Inspired by the work in [20] , we present four basic policy updating operations (Fig. 5 ): 1) Att2OR denotes adding an attribute to an OR gate; 2) AttRmOR denotes removing an attribute from an OR gate; 3) Att2AND denotes adding an attribute to an AND gate; 4) AttRmAND denotes removing an attribute from an AND gate. Assume node y be the AND/OR gate and x 1 , . . . , x m be y's children nodes. A 1 , . . . , A m are the original attributes under y, and att(
Let q y (0) and {q x 1 (0), . . . , q x m (0)} denote the secret shares for node y and his children nodes. Given an access tree T w , based on share q x (0), the DHABKS produces a ciphertext for each leave node x, and we denote the original and new ciphertexts of node x i as C i and C i , respectively.
•Att2OR : It can be used to update a (1, m) gate to a (1, m + 1) gate. Given the secret shares q y (0) for node y that will be updated and the new access policy T , the data owner generates new secret shares {q x 1 (0), . . . , q x m+1 (0)} for attributes A 1 , . . . , A m+1 by running SSS. We have q x i (0) = q x i (0) = q y (0) for i ∈ [1, m + 1], the ciphertexts of the original attributes A 1 , . . . , A m will not be changed,
For the update attribute A m+1 , the data owner will generate a new ciphertext C m+1 based on q x m+1 (0). Thus the newly instruction for Att2OR is set to = {Fid, Att2OR, NULL, C m+1 }. Finally, based on , the CSP will add C m+1 to the original ciphertexts cph w and update the access tree by adding A m+1 under node y.
•AttRmOR : It can be used to transform a (1, m) gate to a (1, m − 1) gate. Similar to Att2OR operation, since
. Therefore, the update instruction that data owner sends to CSP is = {Fid, AttRmOR, NULL, NULL}. On receiving , the CSP will remove C m from cph w and update the access tree by removing A m under node y.
•Att2AND : It can be used to update a (m, m) gate to a (m + 1, m + 1) gate. Given the secret shares q y (0) for node y that will be updated and the new access policy T , the data owner generates new secret shares {q x 1 (0), . . . , q x m+1 (0)} for attributes A 1 , . . . , A m+1 by running SSS. Then, it will generate the update key UK for attributes A 1 , . . . , A m + 1 according to the GenUpd algorithm. Based on q x m+1 (0), it generates a ciphertext C m+1 for the update attribute A m+1 . Thus, the update instruction submitted to the cloud is = {Fid, Att2AND, UK , C m+1 }. Finally, based on , the CSP updates the ciphertext C i to C i for i ∈ [1, m] by ExeUpd algorithm, and updates the access tree to T w by adding A m+1 under node y. •AttRmAND : It can be used to update a (m, m) gate to a (m − 1, m − 1) gate. Given the secret shares q y (0) for node y that will be updated and the new access policy T , the data owner generates new secret shares {q x 1 (0), . . . , q x m−1 (0)} for attributes A 1 , . . . , A m−1 by running SSS. Then, it will generate the update key UK for attributes A 1 , . . . , A m −1 according to GenUpd algorithm. Thus, the update instruction submitted to the cloud is = {Fid, AttRmAND, UK , NULL}. Finally, based on , the CSP will update the ciphertext C i to C i for i ∈ [1, m − 1] by ExeUpd algorithm, and updates the access tree to T w by removing A m under node y.
V. CONSTRUCTION
In this section, we will first construct the scheme, and then provide its correctness proof and security sketch. Fig. 6 illustrates the working process of the DHABKS scheme. Our research focuses on preservation of keyword privacy and query privacy. The file privacy preservation can be solved by ABE [10] , thus we omit the construction of GenKey, EncFile, and Decrypt algorithms in our paper.
A. THE SCHEME
(Initialization phase)
•Init(λ, A) → (PK A , MK ): Given a bilinear map system S N = (N = pq, G 0 , G 1 , e) , where G 0 and G 1 are cyclic groups of composite order n = sn , and e : G 0 × G 0 → G 1 , the TTP takes the random generators g ∈ G k and VOLUME 6, 2018 ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 ∈ G n , where G k and G n are two subgroups of G 0 . Thus, we have e(g, ϕ 1 ) = e(g, ϕ 2 ) = 1 but e(g, g) = 1. Then, it employs hash function H 1 : {0, 1} * → G 0 , mapping the root attribute R to a random group element, and one-way hash function H 2 : {0, 1} * → Z n mapping the key words described as a binary string to a random integer. It randomly chooses θ 1 , θ 2 , a, b, c ∈ Z * n and sets the system public key PK A and the system master key MK as follows: a, b, c, p, q, n ) •KeyGen(PK , MK , S u ) → sk u : The TTP generates search key sk u for data user u, who associated with attribute set S u . It first randomly selects r ∈ Z n , and computes D = g (ac−r)/b . Then, it selects a random r j ∈ Z n for each attribute (see Eq. 1). The search key is set as follows:
(Store phase)
•EncKW (PK , w, T w ) → (cph w , ): To encrypt keyword w associated to access tree T w , the data owner u first randomly chooses r 1 , σ ∈ Z n and computes K 1 = g cr 1 , K 2 = g a(r 1 +σ ) g bH 2 (w)r 1 , and K 3 = g bσ . Next, for each attribute
, where
and q x i (0) is the secret share σ of leave node x i in T w generated by SSS. The ciphertext cph w can be set as the following:
The data owner needs to compute = {q x i (0)} x i ∈lev(T w ) generated by SSS to update access tree T w to T w .
(Search phase)
•TokenGen(sk u , w) → Tok w : When data user u associated with attribute set S u tries to access files containing keyword w, he firstly selects a random s ∈ Z n , and computes tk 1 = (g a g bH 2 
•Search(Tok w , cph w ) → {0, 1}: Upon receiving the search token Tok w , the CSP first constructs a set S from T w that satisfies the access tree T w specified in cph w 
where 
Then, for each attribute A i ∈ S, where A i = att(x i ) for x i ∈ lev(T ), the secret share q x i (0) is reconstructed by using:
where
Next, it conducts the Lagrange interpolation to recover E R = e(g, g) rsσ . Finally, it checks whether Eq. 8 holds. If so, 1 is the output. Otherwise, it outputs 0.
The data owner u should first locate the gate node that will be updated, when given the new access tree T w for keyword w. Assume node y denotes the AND/OR gate node that will be modified, where A 1 , . . . , A m are original attributes under node y and A 1 , . . . , A m are new attributes, respectively. Given q y (0) be the share secret associated with y, it uses the SSS algorithm to obtain the new secret shares for nodes x 1 , . . . , x m in T w , denoted as {q x i (0)} i∈ [1,m ] . Then, it will generate update key UK for attributes A 1 , . . . , A m as follows:
where δ = q x i (0) − q x i (0). In addition, to add an attribute A m+1 under node y, the data owner u will compute the new ciphertext C m+1 = (C x m+1 ,C x m+1 ) for A m+1 , as follows:
C m+1 will be used as the auxiliary information .
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•ExeUpd(UK , , cph w ) → cph w : Based on the update key UK , the CSP updates the original keyword ciphertext cph w . For each leave node x i under node y, it updates C i to C i as follows: [1,m] (11) Then, the new ciphertext cph w for keyword w can be set as: (12) B. CORRECTNESS AND SECURITY SKETCH 1) Correctness SKETCH
In the Search algorithm of our DHABKS scheme, for each attribute A i ∈ S, we have
= e(g, g) rsσ by conducting the Lagrange interpolation. Thus, the right side of Eq. 8 evolves as follows:
bcsH 2 (w)r 1 (13) The left side of Eq. 8 evolves as follows:
bcsH 2 (w)r 1 (14) Thus, Eq. 8 holds when and only when S u T w . We can prove that after updating by the GenUpd and ExeUpd algorithms the output of the Search algorithm is still correct. Here, we only give the correctness proof of the Att2AND operation due to the limited space. For all leave nodes in T w , the secret shares of σ is set to q x 1 (0) , . . . , q x m (0) , q x m+1 (0) . Then for the original attribute A i , i ∈ [1, m], C i = (C x i ,C x i ) can be constructed as follows:
Then, in the Search algorithm, for i ∈ [1, m], the secret share q x i (0) is reconstructed as follows:
The new ciphertext C m+1 corresponding to A m+1 is shown in Eq. 10. Thus, in the Search algorithm, the secret share q x m+1 (0) is reconstructed as follows:
Then, the value E R = e(g, g) rsq R (0) = e(g, g) rsσ can be recovered only when S u T w . Therefore, the DHABKS scheme is correct.
2) SECURITY SKETCH
Given the one-way hash function H 2 , the ABKS scheme has been be proven [8] that in the generic bilinear group model it is selectively secure against chosen-keyword attack and in the random oracle model it can achieve keyword secrecy. In correctness sketch we have prove that our scheme can correctly carry out search operation after updating the new access policy AP K . Therefore, the security of DHABKS scheme can be derived from that of the ABKS scheme.
VI. EVALUATION A. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
We analyze the performance of our DHABKS scheme on real data set, and compare it with ABKS [8] scheme from two aspects: computational and communication complexity. We use the following notations to describe the computational overhead for various operations in both schemes: H 1 denotes the operation of hash function that maps a binary string to an element of G 0 ; E 0 and E 1 denote the exponentiation operation in G 0 and G 1 , respectively; e denotes the pairing operation. We neglect the hash function H 2 : {0, 1} * → Z n in group Z n and multiplication in G 0 and G 1 , since the cost of them are much less than that of above operations. Table 2 and Table 3 show the asymptotic complexity of the ABKS scheme and our DHABKS scheme, where S 1 and S 2 denote the number of attributes associated with a data user in the ABKS scheme and DHABKS scheme respectively; N 1 and N 2 denote the number of attributes in a data owner's access policy in the ABKS scheme and our DHABKS scheme respectively; |G 0 | denotes the length of elements in G 0 ; m denotes the number of attributes under an AND/OR gate node which needs to be updated in our scheme. For the TTP, the Init algorithm runs in system initialization phase, and can be done once for all. In general, it spends the most of time for running KeyGen algorithm to generate search key sk, the complexity of which relates to the number of attributes associated with a user, i.e., S 1 in ABKS scheme and S 2 in our scheme. For the data owner, the EncKW algorithm is mainly impacted by the number of attributes in the specified access policy, i.e., N 1 in ABKS scheme and N 2 in our scheme. The GenUpd algorithm is mainly impacted by m, the number of attributes under the updating gate node. For the data user,the running time of TokenGen algorithm increase with S 1 in ABKS scheme and S 2 in our scheme. For the CSP, the ExeUpd algorithm is mainly impacted by m.
The computation complexity of KeyGen algorithm in our scheme is larger than that of the ABKS scheme. However, the number of attributes associated with a user S 2 in our scheme can be decreased by introducing an attribute hierarchy into the ABKS scheme. Thus the cost of KeyGen algorithm can be still saved in our scheme. In the same way, the access policy can be largely simplified due to the hierarchy attribute, thus the cost of encryption can be largely saved in our scheme. For example, we assume that N 1 = 2 · N 2 , then the cost of encryption will be reduced by 50%. However, the Search algorithm in our scheme will cost more than that of the ABKS scheme, because our scheme need to apply the forward derivation function (FDF) to allow the ancestor attribute node to deduce the secret shares associated with its descendant attribute nodes.
B. PARAMETER SETTING
Our experiments were conducted on a local machine with an Inter Core i5 3.2GHz CPU and 8GB memory, running the Microsoft Windows 7 Ultimate operating system. The programs were implemented with the Java Development Kit (JDK) 1.7, and cryptographic algorithms were implemented with JPBC library [21] . We used a 160-bit elliptic curve y 2 = x 3 + x over 512-bit finite field, where n is a 160-bit length prime, and the length of element in G 0 is 512-bit.
We conducted our experiments on a real data set to evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of the DHABKS scheme. We used the dataset of Internet Request For Comments (RFC) [22] , which has 6,870 plaintext files, the total size of this dataset is about 349MB. We extracted keywords from each file utilizing Hermetic Word Frequency Counter [23] , and ranked them by their frequency of occurrence, then chose 5-10 keywords for each RFC file. In our experiments, we selected 1,000 files from the data set, and extracted 1,307 distinct keywords.
We assume the access policy as AP K 
, we use the same access policy to encrypt each keyword. The parameter settings are as follows: we use N ranging from 1 to 50 to denote the number of attributes in an access policy; use S ranging from 1 to 50 to denote the number of data users' attributes; use m ranging from 1 to 50 to denote the number of attributes under a node needs to be updated. In the implementation, we set N 1 = N and S 1 = S and set S 1 = N 1 in ABKS scheme. In DHABKS, we introduced an attribute hierarchy into ABKS, so that the abstract attributes associated with the access policy can be reduced. We can use clustering method, i.e., hierarchical agglomerative clustering algorithm [24] to generate the abstract attributes involved to the access policy. From the analysis in Section VI-A, we can find that for the data owner the computational and communication overhead of EncKW algorithm impacted mainly by the number of attributes involved in the access policy N 2 . Therefore, a well-designed attribute hierarchy can reduce the number of attributes involved to the access policy, and thus decrease the overhead of scheme. In our experiment, after clustering, the number of abstract attributes for access policy in DHABKS scheme is almost Fig. 7 and Fig. 8 shows the processing time of ABKS scheme and our DHABKS scheme in the initialization phase. As shown in Fig. 7 , when the number of attributes associated with a data user increases from 1 to 50, the Init algorithm spends about 0.16s in ABKS scheme and 0.17s in our scheme. The processing time of KeyGen algorithm in ABKS scheme and in DHABKS scheme is almost the same, which changes from 0.106s to 1.908s as S increases (Fig. 8) . The Init algorithm is runned on the TTP during the system is initialized, when a new cloud user enters the system, the KeyGen algorithm will be executed. Therefore, the overhead of the TTP is relatively low.
C. EXPERIMENT RESULTS
During the store phase, the data owner should execute the EncKW algorithm to encrypt 1,307 distinct keywords which are extracted from 1,000 data files, it incurs the maximal execution time in the whole system. The processing time of the EncKW algorithm in our DHABKS scheme is much less that that of ABKS scheme, as shown in Fig. 9 , the computation overhead of EncKW grows from 20.038s to 689.17s in our scheme and 72.106s to 2483.599s in ABKS scheme when N increases from 1 to 50. In the search phase, the data user first runs TokenGen algorithm to generate a search token, which spends 0.098s to 1.965s (Fig. 10 ) . The CSP performs search operations over a collection of keyword ciphertexts to obtain the matched results. As shown in Fig. 11 , the execution time of Search algorithm grows from 3.066s to 335.876s in ABKS scheme and 10.038s to 563.089s in our scheme. In the update phase, the computation overhead of the GenUpd algorithm in both ABKS scheme and DHABKS scheme is shown in Fig. 12 . We set the access policy as AP = (A 1 ∧ A 2 ∧ . . . ∧ A m ) for the Att2AND and AttRmAND operations, and AP = (A 1 ∨ A 2 ∨ . . . ∨ A m ) for the Att2OR and AttRmOR operations. From Fig. 12 (a) we can find that the processing time for these two operations in ABKS is much more than that of DHABKS scheme. When the number of attributes under the updating gate m changes from 1 to 50, the processing time of Att2AND operations in DHABKS scheme increases from 0.0198s to 0.9601s, while the computation cost of AttRmAND operations in ABKS scheme increases from 0.082s to 2.410s. The reason is that in ABKS [8] , when the access policy is modified, the data owner has to re-encrypt the relevant keywords with the updated access policy and then sends the newly ciphertexts to the cloud, and this processing considerably results in great computation cost on the data owner. However, in DHABKS scheme, the CSP can be delegated to conduct the policy updating operations, and the encryption cost can be largely reduced by introducing attribute hierarchy into ABKS. Specifically, during the update phase, to update an AND gate, the CSP spends 0.18ms to 8.6ms to to run the ExeUpd algorithm for updating the keyword ciphertexts, and it spends 0.01ms to 0.03ms to update the OR gate. Similar situations occur on the operations of Att2OR and AttRmOR. The processing time of these two operations on the data owner is almost close to 0, because the secret share of the remaining attributes is not changed in DHABKS scheme, the computation overhead for these operation can be ignored. However, the processing time of ABKS increases from 0.061s to 1.982s for Att2OR and from 0.012s to 1.907s for AttRmOR, when m grows from 1 to 50. Therefore, compared with the ABKS scheme, our DHABKS scheme spends fewer computation time on the data owner. The experiment results illustrate that in our scheme, the cloud user can take full advantage of the CSP's vast computation capabilities to deploy the keyword search and policy update operations on it. In this way, the workload of the data user can be largely reduced.
VII. RELATED WORK
Our work mainly resides in the area of attribute-based keyword searches over encrypted data. In this section, we will introduce the related work from the following aspects.
A. ATTRIBUTE-BASED ENCRYPTION
The principle of attribute-based encryption (ABE) was proposed by Sahai and Waters [25] , where a fuzzy identity based encryption scheme was presented to allow for faulttolerance encryption. Based on their work, Research [9] proposed key-policy attribute-based encryption (KP-ABE) for VOLUME 6, 2018 fine-grained access policy. In their construction, ciphertexts are labeled with a set of attributes and private keys are associated with access structures. Work in [10] proposed ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE), in which attributes are used to describe a user's credentials while the data owner determines an access policy for who can decrypt. Compared with KP-ABE, CP-ABE enables the data owner to take more initiative on specifying access structure for the ciphertext, and thus is more suitable for a data sharing environment [26] , [27] . In our work, CP-ABE is used to encrypt the data files.
B. SEARCHABLE ENCRYPTION
Searchable encryption (SE) enables the untrusted server to perform keyword-based search over encrypted data without knowing the user's keywords and the file contents. The first SE scheme was proposed by Song et al. [3] , where both the user query and the data were encrypted under a symmetrickey setting. The main drawback of this scheme is that the server has to scan the whole collection of file ciphertext when it performs search operation, which results in linearly increase of the searching cost. Since then, there has been much research in this field, for example, Chang and Mitzenmacher [28] introduced a secure searchable index scheme, which improved the efficiency to sublinear searching cost.
Boneh et al. [4] proposed the first public key-based SE scheme. As an attempt to enrich search predicates, SE schemes that support conjunctive keyword search [29] - [31] , subset query [32] , and range query [33] , have also been proposed. Recently, ranked SE and fuzzy keyword-based SE were proposed to optimize the query results. Ranked SE allows users to access the most matched files from the untrusted server. For example, Wang et al. [34] encrypted file contents and queries using Order Preserving Symmetric Encryption [35] and utilized keyword frequency to rank results, but this approach is designed only for single keyword search; Cao et al. [5] presented a multi-keyword ranked searchable encryption scheme by applying the secure KNN technique [36] to rank results based on inner products; Xia et al. [37] proposed a secure, efficient and dynamic search scheme to realize the efficient multi-keyword ranked search and the dynamic deletion and insertion of documents, in which they constructed a special tree-based index structure and proposed a ''Greedy Depth-first Search'' algotithm. Fuzzy keyword-based SE aims to improve the matching ratio in the case that the users are not sure about the accurate keywords. For example, Li et al. [38] proposed a fuzzy keyword search method over encrypted data, which would return the matched files even if users' searching inputs does not exactly match the predefined keywords; Wang et al. [6] extended fuzzy keyword search to multi-keyword environments by using Bloom filter [39] and locality-sensitive hashing [40] ; Based on Wang et al.'s [6] , [41] scheme, Fu et al. [42] developed a novel method of keyword transformation and introduced the stemming algorithm to handle more misspelling mistake efficiently.
In terms of fine-grained search authorization, Bao et al. [43] presented an authorized searchable encryption in multiusers setting environment, which enables the data owner to implement an access policy by distributing secret keys to some authorized users; Based on hierarchical predicate encryption (HPE) [44] , Li et al. [45] proposed an authorized private keyword search scheme; Zheng et al. [8] proposed an attribute-based keyword search (ABKS) scheme based on ABE, which allowed the data owner to control the keyword search operation over the outsourced encrypted data; Sun et al. [46] presented an verifiable attribute-based keyword search scheme with user revocation(ABKS-UR),it allowed multiple data owners and data users to perform scalable and fine-grained search. This paper proposed the DHABKS scheme by incorporating an attribute hierarchy, PRE and SSS into ABKS. The main merit of our scheme is that it can simultaneously achieve an efficient fine-grained search authorization and dynamic access policy for keywordbased search in a cloud computing environment.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a DHABKS scheme to comprehensively considered efficient fine-grained search permission and efficient update of access policy. DHABKS scheme takes full advantage of CSP's resources deploying the keyword search and policy update operations on the CSP. Extensive experiment results verify its feasibility and effectiveness. However, in the DHABKS scheme we only consider the single-keyword search. In the future work, we will consider the scenario of multi-keyword search, and extend our scheme supporting conjunctive, subset, and range queries on encrypted data. 
